This paper introduces an agency relationship into a dynamic game with informational externalities. Two principals bargain with their respective agents about the production cost which is the private information of the agents and is correlated between them. We find that the agency relationship creates an incentive for simultaneous production, even if this involves an inefficient delay. As the commitment power of the principals decreases, this incentive becomes stronger. When principals compete, the effect of competition is decomposed into two parts. Inter-period competition (from past and future actions) pushes principals towards simultaneous actions, while intra-period competition (from concurrent actions) does the opposite.
Introduction
When thinking about launching a new product, a rm's management or headquarters may not be completely sure about how much it will cost to develop. The R&D division usually has a better idea about the development costs. However, it is unlikely that the division would provide such information for free; typically, it would in ate the costs. The decision of a competitor to introduce a similar product will provide information that the product is not "too expensive" to develop. Headquarters now have a better bargaining position vis-a-vis their R&D division. However, the competitor's headquarters, which face the same problem, may also decide to wait for the information. Natural questions then arise. When is the product launched? Do rms launch the product simultaneously? What is the e ect of the strategic behavior of the R&D divisions? How does competition a ect the equilibrium?
The aim of this paper is to study the e ect of the agency relationship in a dynamic game with informational externalities. Its crucial feature is that the information which is being released and learned is about strategic agents. These can in uence what and when the uninformed parties (principals) learn. Agents' incentives are shaped by both current and expected future rents and, therefore, future information a ects them even before it becomes known.
Learning about the agent from the experience of others but also providing information to them is a feature of many real-life situations. Consider a country opening up to foreign capital. When a foreign rm discusses a joint project (foreign direct investment) with a local rm, it does not know exactly what the cost will be. If local rms have similar technologies, the foreign rm can wait and have a better idea of local rms' characteristics by observing the experience of other foreign rms in this market. However, a late entry may not be as pro table as an early one. Another example is that of unions bargaining with rms. The rms are privately informed of their pro ts, their market prospects, etc. This information is correlated across rms in the same industry. Then, each union may delay the agreement in order to learn the outcome of negotiations in other rms. Waiting too long, however, can be costly as the suppliers and consumers may switch to other rms.
In our model, there are two identical principal-agent pairs, that we call rms, A and B.
1 Each agent produces for his respective principal. The cost of each agent is his private information; principals know only the cost distribution. Each agent produces at most once during the relationship. The costs of the two agents are perfectly correlated. 2 For most of the paper, the principals do not compete, that is, the value they derive from the agent's production does not depend on the production (or its absence) of the other rm.
There are two periods, and all participants share a common discount factor.
Inside each rm, the bargaining proceeds a la Sobel and Takahashi (1983) . In period 1, each principal o ers a price to her agent that she is ready to pay for the product in that period. If the agent accepts it, production takes place; the principal sells the good in the market, and the game ends for this rm. If the agent rejects the o er, the game moves to period 2. The principal then observes whether the other agent has produced the product or not and makes another o er to her agent that he is free to accept or reject.
In any equilibrium, there is a cut-o level of cost at which the agent is indi erent between accepting the rst-period o er (and producing in period 1) and rejecting it (and waiting for a second-period o er). Thus in period 1, by his decision each agent reveals whether his cost is above or below this cut-o . Then, each principal has an incentive to delay the production in order to obtain information about the cost of the other agent and, because they are the same, the cost her own agent. However, the delay is costly because of discounting.
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The agency problem in our adverse selection environment means that each agent may pretend to have higher costs than he actually has. Then, he may reject a pro table o er in period 1 if he expects a su ciently higher o er in period 2. In order to see the e ect of this strategic behavior, we rst consider the benchmark setting in which the agents are non-strategic: each of them accepts any o er in period 1 that is higher than his costs. We then study the full-commitment setting in which the agents are strategic (they can reject an o er above the costs in period 1), but the principals can commit to two-period contracts. We also look at the nocommitment setting in which the agents are strategic and the principals can propose only one-period contracts.
The only feature of the contracting in each rm that is relevant for the other principal is the information generated in period 1, i.e., the cut-o level of cost. We look for the equilibria in these cut-o s. We nd that there are only asymmetric equilibria (in pure strategies) in the benchmark setting, while there are only symmetric equilibria in the full and no-commitment settings. In the benchmark setting, having the same cut-o s implies that the two agents will generate exactly the same information. Principals prefer then to have di erent cut-o s in order to learn more.
When the agents are strategic, in contrast, having the same cut-o s becomes useful as it puts the principals in the best position to limit the strategic behavior of the agents. If an agent deviates from the equilibrium behavior and rejects a rst-period o er which is above his cost, the other agent will still accept the same o er and, therefore, the principal will detect the deviation and will not improve her o er in period 2.
More generally, we show that the sets of symmetric equilibria are always nested:
the smallest is in the benchmark setting (it may be non-empty once competition is introduced) and the largest is in the no-commitment setting. In other words, the agency problem drives the two rms towards symmetric behavior. Moreover, when the contractual imperfections increase and only one-period contracts are available, there is more need to discipline the agents and the symmetric behavior becomes even more likely. The strategic behavior of the agents creates a coordination motive in principals' actions. Therefore, the internal structure of the rm and, in particular, the way the agency problem is solved cannot be studied in isolation from other rms in the market.
E ciency is a ected by informational externalities via two e ects. The rst e ect is a standard one: the possibility to learn in the future causes the principals to delay the production, which harms e ciency. 4 The second e ect is strategic and increases e ciency. Since o ers in period 2 are made under better information, they give a lower rent to the agent in period 2 and, therefore, the agent becomes "softer", i.e., more likely to accept a given o er, in period 1. The second e ect arises, obviously, only when the agents are strategic. In the benchmark setting there is just the rst e ect, so informational externalities decrease e ciency. In the fullcommitment setting, the strategic e ect is crucial. In the autarky, i.e., when there is only one principal-agent pair, the principal would commit to a take-it-or-leave-it o er in period 1 which is very ine cient. 5 Information obtained from the other rm allows the principal to revise her o er and to contract with high cost types in period 2. In the no-commitment setting, the strategic e ect becomes less important as the principals revise their o ers anyway and the autarky is relatively e cient. The standard e ect is likely to dominate, as in the benchmark setting.
Competition may take various forms and we allow for a great exibility in the ways in which it a ects principals' pro ts. We distinguish intra-period competition, that is, competition from concurrent sales, from inter-period competition, that is, competition from past sales and future sales. Competition from past sales re ects rst-mover advantage: a second entrant in the market obtains smaller revenues than the rst one. We nd that inter-period competition pushes the two rms towards symmetric behavior. For example, in the benchmark setting the competitive pressure may force the principals to forego the bene ts of more information and opt to make the same o ers. The e ect of intra-period competition is the opposite. Principals may choose to o er di erent contracts and tolerate some strategic play of the agents in order to di erentiate themselves and produce in di erent periods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Below we discuss the related literature. In Section 2 we introduce the model and nd equilibria in the benchmark and the full-commitment settings assuming no competition. In Section 3 we introduce competition and analyze the e ects of the four kinds of competition mentioned above. We study the no-commitment setting in Section 4. In Section 5 we consider alternative information structures. The rst structure allows for imperfect correlation between the costs of the two agents, while in the second the costs of an agent are completely revealed if he produces in period 1, for example, through reverse engineering by the other principal. Section 6 concludes.
Related literature
The two most closely related papers are those of Kuhn (1998) and Drugov (2007) . Gu and Kuhn (1998) study simultaneous bargaining of several rms with their unions. However, in order to simplify the model, they assume that the principal (union) can make an o er only once (but can choose when) and, therefore, the agent ( rm) cannot be strategic. 6 This setup roughly corresponds to our benchmark setting. In Drugov (2007) the agent can strategically reject the principal's o er in an anticipation of a higher rent in the future. The model there is quite di erent as there are only two types of agent, but the quantity produced is continuous. In both papers, the only cost of the delay is discounting. In this paper, when principals compete, the cost of the delay is also a disadvantage of not being the rst in the market and, therefore, depends on the strategy of other players. In other words, both the bene ts of the delay (learning the information revealed by others) and the costs of the delay (being late in the market) are fully endogenous and may vary in di erent equilibria.
There is an extensive literature on learning from competitors. It may be about a technology (see, for example, Reinganum (1989) and De Bondt (1997) for surveys of patent, or R&D, races) or about the market or demand characteristics as in Rob (1991), D ecamps and Mariotti (2004) and others. The crucial di erence is that, in this paper, the learning is about the agent who is a strategic player. In models of the investment-under-uncertainty type as in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , better information in the future always delays the investment since it increases the payo of investing in the future while the payo of investing today is unchanged. In an agency model, better future information makes the agent softer both in the future and in the present, and may lead to more contracting in the present, i.e., a smaller delay (Drugov (2010) , Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2010) ).
Several recent papers such as Raith (2003) , Golan, Parlour, and Rajan (2007) and Marin and Verdier (2008) study a market equilibrium in which the agency problem inside rms and market competition interact and in uence each other. We also make a step in this direction. These papers study models with moral hazard in which competition a ects contracts inside rms through changes in the pro ts that the principal obtains from a given agent's action. In our model, the agency problem is adverse selection, and competition has a dual role of providing information about the agents' types and changing principal's pro ts from a given contract. However, the informational role of competition may be important in the moral hazard environment as well. Indeed, starting with Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Holmstr• om (1982) comparing performance of di erent agents is known to provide additional information, if there are common shocks to agents' performance. 7 Then, the dual role exogenous. The rst bargaining occurs in the autarky, while the second starts with more information. 7 See also Meyer and Vickers (1997) for a dynamic model.
of competition seems natural independently of the type of the agency problem.
It is well known that the principal can use correlation among agents' types to extract rents (see Cr emer and McLean (1985) and Shleifer (1985) for early papers).
We obviously use this insight but the present paper di ers in two aspects. First, in our paper there are two "principal-agent" pairs and not a single principal dealing with two agents. Second, we study a dynamic game which allows us to analyze delay in contracting.
8 Several papers study an adverse selection problem with an exogenous signal about agent's type. This is precisely the rst step in analyzing our model, the signal being information revealed by the other rm (taken as given). Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2010) analyze an in nite-horizon bargaining model and show that the delay is non-monotonic in the likelihood of a signal that reduces informational asymmetry. In Drugov (2010) , in a two-period model, we show a related result that the delay is non-monotonic in the quality of the signal (as Drugov (2007) , it is a two-type model with continuous quantity). In Strausz (2006) the model is also dynamic but the agent has unlimited liability which is known to be crucial for Cr emer-McLean mechanisms (together with risk neutrality). Other papers, such as Riordan and Sappington (1988) , Demougin and Garvie (1991) , Boyer and La ont (2003) and Gary-Bobo and Speigel (2006) , study a static adverse selection problem with an exogenous contractible signal.
The Model

Setup
There are two principal-agent pairs, that we call rms, A and B, and in each of them the agent is supposed to produce a certain good. In each rm, the principal negotiates with her agent about the price she will pay for the production. There are two periods, and all parties share a common discount factor < 1. Each agent produces at most once, either in period 1 or in period 2 or does not produce at all.
The two agents have the same cost which is uniformly distributed on [0; 1].
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They know , but principals know only its distribution.
8 Another early paper is Nalebu and Stiglitz (1983) that discusses, mostly informally, the bene ts of relative compensation in markets where rms have correlated costs.
9 Assuming uniform distribution allows us to obtain closed-form solutions. Qualitative results do not depend on this assumption. 10 We consider imperfect correlation in Section 5.1.
If an agent produces the good in period 1, the principal sells it in the market and obtains revenues of v 1 ; producing in period 2 yields revenues v 2 . In this Section, there is no competition between principals so the revenues do not depend on the behavior of the other rm (competition is analyzed in Section 3). Producing in period 1 is more pro table, v 1 v 2 , since the good may be sold for two periods (if it is nondurable) or it may be used for two periods (if it is a durable good). Also, it is always e cient to produce, v 2 1 . Therefore, if some types do not produce, this is only for rent-extraction reasons. Finally, we also assume that v 1 2 in order to avoid trivial cases.
The timing of the game is as follows. At the beginning of period 1 each principal proposes a contract to her respective agent. If an agent agrees to produce in period 1, he does so, the principal earns v 1 and the game is over for that rm. If the agent does not produce in period 1, the principal observes whether the other agent has produced in period 1 (but she does not observe the contract between the other principal and the agent). Then the principal makes an o er in the beginning of period 2 which the agent accepts or rejects. Production, transfers and selling of the good in the market, if any, take place and the game ends.
The agency problem in our adverse selection environment means that the agent may pretend to have higher costs than he actually has. Then, he may reject a pro table o er in period 1 if he expects a su ciently higher o er in period 2. In order to see the e ect of this strategic behavior, we rst consider the benchmark setting in which the agents are non-strategic: they accept any o er in period 1 that is higher than their costs. It can also be interpreted as the principals committing to outsource the production if the o er is rejected. We then study the full-commitment setting in which the agents are strategic (they can reject an o er above their costs in period 1) and the principals can commit to a two-period contract (possibly conditional on the production of the other rm in period 1). In Section 4, we also look at the nocommitment setting in which the agents are strategic and the principals can propose only one-period contracts.
A strategy of each agent is a triple (p 1 ; p y 2 ; p n 2 ) (all o ered in period 1 or not, depending on the setting), where p 1 is the price to be paid to the agent if he produces in period 1; and p y 2 and p n 2 are the prices, conditional on whether the other rm has produced or not, to be paid for the production in period 2.
11 We consider only pure 11 The fact that p 1 is not conditional on the behaviour of the other pair matters only if the agent strategies.
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The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. We solve the model in the following way. In period 1, an agent is indi erent about producing or not producing when his type is the cut-o type, = s. If < s, the agent strictly prefers to produce in period 1; while he strictly prefers not to produce if > s.
The information revealed by each rm after period 1 is a partition, whether the type is below or above s. Then, s summarizes all the information revealed by each rm after period 1 and, therefore, only s (which is the probability of production in 
The Benchmark
In the benchmark setting, the agents do not behave strategically. Facing an o er p 1 , agent A accepts it if it is higher than his costs. Thus, the cut-o type is s A = p 1 .
After period 1, observing whether rm B has produced or not, principal A learns if the agent's costs are higher or lower than s B (remember that the costs are perfectly correlated). There are two cases to consider depending on whether their rst-period o er p 1 is higher or lower than s B .
Start with the case s A s B that we call case a (for above). The information generated by rm B is useless since, following a rejection of an o er in period 1, the principal learns that is higher than s A which is more precise than the fact that is higher than s B . Then, principal A acts as if she were in the autarky (i.e., alone in is strategic and it is justi ed by additional assumptions that we introduce in Section 2.3 on full commitment.
12 Mixed strategies introduce a signi cant complication since the updated beliefs after observing (no) production by the other pair in period 1 are not truncated uniform. Also, a pure-strategy equilibrium always exists in our model. the market) and solves the following problem
(1) (superscript "BM" refers to the benchmark setting).
When p 1 and p n 2 are o ered, with probability p 1 = s A the production takes place in period 1; in which case the pro ts are v 1 p 1 ; with probability p n 2 p 1 it takes place in period 2; in which case the pro ts are (v 2 p n 2 ). If agent A rejects p 1 , principal A never observes production in rm B and therefore p y 2 is irrelevant. The two prices are obtained from the rst-order conditions of (1) unless the constraints 
From the rst-order conditions and the constraints, the expressions for the three prices are 13 This is the setting of Sobel and Takahashi (1983) .
The price o ered when there was no production by rm B, p have been found using (2) and (4), respectively, we can nd when s A is above and below s B and therefore characterize the optimal contract as a function of s B . This is done in the next Lemma. We only characterize s A in the text of the Lemma since it is enough to nd equilibria. We
give the complete characterization in the proof in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 In the benchmark setting, there are two cases:
1, there exists
such that
Proof. See Appendix.
An immediate corollary of Lemma 1 is the following.
Corollary 1 In the benchmark setting, s A is never equal to s B . is the same at s B = 0 and at s B = 1 since there is no information actually revealed and, therefore, the autarky solution is implemented.
The two rms are identical; thus, the reaction function of rm B is the inverse of that of rm A. Then, in order to nd equilibria we need to nd intersections of the reaction curve s A s B with its inverse, which is done in the next Proposition (the exact values of equilibrium points are given in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 In the benchmark setting, there are only two equilibria and they are asymmetric.
In an asymmetric equilibrium, by de nition, the rst-period production in one rm, say, rm A, is higher than that in rm B, s A > s B . Then, when 2 s B ; s A only rm A produces in period 1. In other words, with probability s
is the "leader" and rm B is the "follower" producing in period 2 with a positive probability. The strategy of rm B can be described as "wait and see" and it is more pro table than being the "leader" (see pro ts in Figure 1 ). Firm A, knowing that rm B will wait, has to act on its own and use the autarky solution. This asymmetric equilibrium exists despite the fact that the rms are ex ante identical and there is a place for both of them in the market.
Let us discuss the e ciency of the equilibria. Production is always e cient in our model since v 1 v 2 1. For the same total production over two periods, it is more e cient to produce in period 1 than in period 2 since v 1 > (v 2 ).
Second-period prices and, therefore, second-period production are weakly increasing 14 The only di erence between the two cases is that the constraint p in the rst-period price (production). Then, e ciency increases with the rst-period production, i.e., with s.
In an asymmetric equilibrium, the "leader" has a higher rst-period production and, thus, is more e cient than the "follower". The behavior of the "leader", as we noted above, is the same as in the autarky, that is, when each rm acts on its own. The autarky is then more e cient since both rms would behave as "leaders".
Indeed, informational externalities create an incentive to delay the production which is ine cient, though, privately optimal. This is the only e ect in the benchmark setting. 
Full commitment
In this Section, the agents are strategic: they agree to produce in period 1 only if their rents are higher than their expected rent from waiting for period 2. The principals can commit to two-period contracts.
We make two following assumptions to ensure that, if principals want to use the information from the other rm, they have to delay the production until period 2.
16 First, limited liability of the agents: the rent earned by an agent (payment he receives minus his true costs) is consumed in the same period and cannot be claimed back later even if the principal realizes, after observing the other rm, that she has paid too much. Second, the credit (or cash) constraint of the agent: the principal has to cover the (claimed) costs of the agent in the period when the production takes place. That is, the principal cannot order the production and pay for it later when there will be more information. 17 These constraints imply that, at the beginning of period 1, each principal proposes a rst-period price p 1 and a non-negative bonus to be paid later (conditional on future information). Moreover, only an agent with costs below p 1 can accept this o er, and therefore, s A p 1 . The bonus could be used to bring s A closer to p 1 ; however, as we will see below, the full commitment solution involves s A = p 1 and the optimal bonus is actually zero. Then, the contract 15 In a di erent model, informational externalities could improve second-period production of all the rms, not only of the "follower". Then, there would be a trade-o between a higher delay of the "follower" and a better second-period production of the "leader". 16 We do so that the full-commitment setting is more comparable to the benchmark setting of Section 2.2 and the no-commitment setting of Section 4.
17 Alternatively, we could replace these two assumptions by assuming that with a small probability the costs of the two agents are independent and the agent can never incur a loss. See Section 5.1 where we solve such a model (for any probability that the costs are independent). o ered by each principal at the beginning of period 1 is a triple (p 1 ; p
Once contracts have been o ered (simultaneously and secretly) by the principals, each agent decides whether to produce in period 1 or not; if he does not, he will be o ered a pre-speci ed second-period price conditional on the production of the other rm. As in the benchmark setting, we rst look for the optimal cut-o 
The problem of principal A is
In case b, i.e., s A s B , by a similar logic, the type which is indi erent between production in period 1 and in period 2 is s A s B given by
Principal A's problem is
1 and (7).
The next Lemma simpli es further analysis. It says that the principal commits not to change her o er (unless there is evidence that the rst-period price was unacceptable for the agent). The reason is that the losses that occur because the agent delays his production outweigh the bene ts of an additional production in period 2.
This is the same reason as in Sobel and Takahashi (1983) and, more generally, in the bargaining literature where, for example, the seller, selling to a privately informed buyer, restricts sales to the rst period.
Lemma 2 In case a,
Proof. For case a, plug (5) into
and di erentiate it with respect to p
As v 1 v 2 , the derivative is negative if p n 2 > p 1 . Then, p n 2 = p 1 and, from (5),
Note that in case b the second-period price when no rm produced in period 1, ; 1 o . The principal commits not to change her o er unless she receives a signal that the rst-period o er was too low.
As the principal commits not to increase the (relevant) price in the future, the agent accepts any o er above his costs. Then, the rst-period price is also the agent's type which is indi erent about producing in period 1 or 2. The next Lemma characterizes the optimal s A . Figure 2 shows the optimal s A , prices and pro ts.
Lemma 3 In the full-commitment setting, there exists F C < and still uses the information.
Let us now turn to the equilibria of the game which are characterized in the next Proposition.
Proposition 2 In the full-commitment setting, there is a continuum of symmetric equilibria in which both rms have the same production s
. There are no other equilibria.
All the equilibria are symmetric in the full-commitment setting. This means that the two rms always produce simultaneously, whether it be in period 1 or in period 2. The two rms generate the same information (the same partition) and principals use the information from the other rm to discipline their respective agents. In the benchmark setting, there was no need for this and generating the same information was useless. Now, by o ering identical contracts, principals can detect strategic rejection of the contract in period 1, that is, rejection when the costs of the agent are below p 1 , since in this case both agents are supposed to accept the contracts and produce in period 1. Then, principals can contract with their agents in period 2 when no rm produced before o ering p n 2 > p 1 without a strategic response from the agent in period 1. Indeed, as we see from (7), p n 2 does not a ect s A in case b.
These multiple symmetric equilibria can be ranked in terms of their e ciency.
As we noted above, a higher rst-period production, that is, a higher cut-o s, corresponds to a higher and earlier total production and, therefore, a higher e ciency.
Then, the "highest" symmetric equilibrium, in which s
, is the most e cient one. In the autarky, each rm produces at the same level s = v 1 2 in period 1;
however, principals commit to this take-it-or-leave-it o er and there is no production in period 2. Information obtained from the o er allows principals to o er a higher price p n 2 in period 2 without a possibility of strategic rejection of their o er in period 1. This is the strategic e ect which increases e ciency. In the highest symmetric equilibrium informational externalities only improve contracting in period 2, as compared to the autarky. In other equilibria, they also cause a higher delay in period 1 which is a standard negative e ect. Comparison with the autarky becomes then ambiguous.
A more e cient equilibrium is always associated with higher prices o ered to the agents which means higher rents for them. The pro t-maximizing equilibrium is, however, an intermediate one as we can see in Figure 2 . Then, in equilibria below the pro t-maximizing one the principals, the agents and consumers all want to move to a higher equilibrium. In equilibria above the pro t-maximizing one, the preferences of the principals are opposed to those of agents and consumers.
Competition
In this Section, we introduce competition. We allow for a great generality parametrizing possible e ects of competition in the following way. Intra-period competition arises when the two rms produce in the same period.
18 If this happens in period 1, each principal earns 1 v 1 , 1 1, and if in period 2, each principal earns 2 v 2 , 2 1. Inter-period competition arises when the two rms produce in two di erent periods. Under competition from past sales, a rm su ers when it is the second to produce and in this case its revenues decrease to p v 2 , p 1. The rst rm then has a rst-mover advantage. Under competition from future sales, the rm which rst produces su ers from the market's anticipation that the other rm will produce later. Its revenues then decrease to f v 1 ; f 1. 19 We keep our assumption that it is always e cient to produce, that is, 1 v 1 ; 2 v 2 ; p v 2 and f v 1 are all greater than 1.
A stronger competition means that revenues fall more and, therefore, it corresponds to a lower 1 , etc.
20
18 A good interpretation is that agents are R&D divisions and the principals are headquarters. The agents develop a new product that is then produced by principals at zero cost and sold in the market.
19 More precisely, its revenues become a combination of f v 1 and v 1 weighted by the probability that the competitor will introduce the product in period 2.
20 Note that competition a ects the uninformed party. It can also a ect the informed party, for example, when suppliers (with known costs) sell the input to downstream rms with unknown valuations. The e ects of competition would still be similar. the four kinds of competition described above and these four e ects. This is described in s B goes further away from one. We also say that the set of symmetric equilibria expands to describe the opposite phenomenon. Table 1 should be interpreted in the following way. Each line describes the e ects of one of the four kinds of competition. Consider, for example, the rst line which corresponds to a stronger intra-period competition in period 1, i.e., a lower 1 . It a ects both the benchmark and full-commitment settings. It decreases the optimal cut-o type in case b (and does not a ect it in case a). The set of symmetric equilibria shrinks.
Below, we start with inter-period competition from past sales and study it in some detail. In particular, we characterize optimal s A in the benchmark setting and show that symmetric equilibria might appear. We summarize the results for the three other kinds of competition, providing intuition for their e ects. Then, we provide an example of how a standard model of competition (Hotelling's spatial model) translates into intra-and inter-period competition.
Finally, we show that, independently of the strength and the form of competition, symmetric equilibria exist for a larger range of parameters in the full-commitment 21 Only in the benchmark setting.
setting than in the benchmark setting.
Inter-period competition from past sales
A stronger inter-period competition from past sales, or a bigger rst-mover advantage, corresponds to a lower p . It hurts rm A when rm A produces in period 2 while rm B has produced in period 1, that is, when s A < p y 2 s B . Then, in case a, competition from past sales does not have any e ect.
Consider case b and let us start with the benchmark setting. Problem (3) should be replaced by
The only di erence with (3) is that, when production takes place after that of the other rm, the revenues are multiplied by p . As intuition suggests, a stronger competition (lower p ) decreases pro ts (apply envelope theorem). The prices become (compare with (4))
We see that p 1 = s A decreases with p and, therefore, a stronger competition from past sales (lower p ) will increase p 1 . A lower p makes waiting until period 2 less attractive and therefore increases production in period 1.
Lemma 10 in the Appendix characterizes the optimal p 1 . In particular, compared
to Lemma 1, a new case 0 appears: whenever
This obviously gives rise to symmetric equilibria that we did not observe before, in . For pro ts, the scale is adjusted.
The next Lemma characterizes equilibria in the benchmark setting.
Lemma 4 In the benchmark setting, under inter-period competition from past sales, there are the following equilibria:
1, there is a continuum of symmetric equilibria in which both rms produce at the same level s
: There are no asymmetric equilibria.
1,2. If
< 1, there are only two equilibria and they are asymmetric.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 1.
Thus, under competition from past sales, symmetric equilibria appear whenever
1. A lower p makes this condition easier to satisfy and it expands the
, where s A = s B , to the right. In the same spirit, a lower p makes the asymmetric equilibria of cases 1 and 2 of the benchmark setting less asymmetric, in the sense that the cut-o s in the two rms in period 1 become closer to each other. Indeed, in these equilibria in one of the rms (say, A) the production is higher than that of rm B, s A > s B : Then, s A is not a ected by p ; while s B decreases with p . The ratio of the higher cut-o to the smaller one (from Lemma 10 in Appendix, case 1)
increases in p and, therefore, a lower p moves it towards one. The same holds for case 2.
Consider now the full-commitment setting. There, the principals commit not to contract with the agent in period 2 (unless the costs are revealed to be higher than the rst-period price), and so when s Consider now intra-period competition in period 1. If both rms produce in period 1, they obtain only 1 v 1 each, 1 1. A stronger intra-period competition corresponds to a lower 1 . It a ects both the benchmark and the full-commitment settings.
In case a, the principals' pro ts in period 1, instead of (v 1 p 1 ) s A , become . The same may happen in case 0 of the benchmark setting.
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Whenever symmetric equilibria do not exist, asymmetric equilibria arise with the 22 We implicitly assume that there is also competition from past sales (or future sales) under which symmetric equilibria in the benchmark setting may exist.
23 Once 1 is introduced, s A becomes equal to 1 v1 2 in case b. 24 In particular, the condition that separates case 0 from cases 1 and 2 in the benchmark setting becomes same structure, as in cases 1 and 2 of the benchmark setting.
The next Proposition summarizes the e ects of a lower 1 .
Proposition 4 A stronger intra-period competition in period 1 (lower 1 ) decreases the cut-o type s in case b and shrinks the range of symmetric equilibria from the right in both the benchmark and the full-commitment settings.
Intra-period competition in period 2
Suppose now that there is intra-period competition in period 2. If both rms produce in period 2, they obtain only 2 v 2 each, 2 1. A stronger intra-period competition corresponds to a lower 2 .
The crucial di erence (and complication) of this kind of competition is that the pro ts of each rm are now a ected not only by the other agent's cut-o type s (in period 1), but also by his cut-o type in period 2 in the case where nobody produced in period 1 which is p n 2 . In other words, the strategy of each rm is now a two-dimensional vector (s; p n 2 ).
In the benchmark setting, intra-period competition in period 2 hurts pro ts in both cases a and b since in each there is some probability that none of the agents produces in period 1. In case a, exposure to this kind of competition occurs whenever ] may not exist once v 2 is decreased to 2 v 2 at its lower end.
In the full-commitment setting, only case b is a ected since in case a there is no production in period 2. In case b, the pro ts are not a ected at the margin and,
(when 1 = 1, we obtain the condition in Lemma 4). Its left-hand side increases with 1 ; therefore, a stronger competition (lower 1 ) makes it more di cult to satisfy. (from below). Therefore, symmetric equilibria always exist in the full commitment setting.
The next Proposition summarizes the e ects of a stronger intra-period competition in period 2.
Proposition 5 A stronger intra-period competition in period 2 (lower 2 ) shrinks the range of symmetric equilibria from the left in both settings and increases the cut-o type s in case a of the benchmark setting. Under this kind of competition, as well as under intra-period competition in period 2, the pro ts of the principals are a ected not only by the other agent's cuto type s (in period 1) but also by his cut-o type in period 2 in the case where nobody produced in period 1 which is p n 2 . In other words, the strategy of each rm is a two-dimensional vector (s; p n 2 ).
Case b in each setting is not a ected as, there, rm A produces only if rm B does. In case a, when only rm A is to sell in period 1 (that is, when the costs of the agents are between s B and s A ), the market knows that for types of the agent lower than p y;B 2 , rm B will sell in period 2. We obtain immediately that the fullcommitment setting is not a ected at all since there s A = p y 2 , that is, there is no production in period 2 by rm B if rm A produces in period 1.
In the benchmark setting, the pro ts in case a decrease. The e ect on marginal pro ts, and therefore prices and s A , depends on whether the constraint p The next Proposition summarizes the e ects of competition from future sales.
Proposition 6 A stronger competition from future sales (lower f ) expands the range of symmetric equilibria to the left and decreases the cut-o type s in case a in the benchmark setting. It does not a ect the full-commitment setting.
Example: Hotelling's competition
We show here how Hotelling's model of horizontal di erentiation translates into the intra-and inter-period competition described above. Consider a "linear city" of length 1 populated by consumers distributed uniformly across the city. Firm A is located at the left end of the city, while the rm B is located at the right end and consumers have transportation cost c < 2 3
per unit of length. The (per period)
valuation of each consumer is 1. The product is non-durable and, therefore, if a rm produces in period 1, it will sell it for two periods. 26 Then, if a consumer located at x buys the product from rm A at price p, his utility is
If rm A is alone selling the product in the market and sets its price equal to p, it sells to consumers located below . 27 Then,
(1 + ) and v 2 = 1 4c .
When the two rms compete o ering p A and p B , the consumer located at x such that p A + x c = p B + (1 x ) c is indi erent between buying from rm A and rm 26 "Production" by the agent can be thought as the development of a new product and once the product has been developed, the production costs are zero.
27 If rms could choose their location, the monopolist would place itself in the middle of the interval and earn 1 c 2 . All the qualitative results would still hold.
B. Firm
taking p B as given. In the equilibrium, p A = p B = c and each rm earns c 2
. Then,
We can now nd 1 and other parameters:
Lower transportation cost c increases pro ts when the rm is a monopolist, v 1 and v 2 , since more consumers are served. In the competition case, lower c decreases pro ts since competition becomes more intense. Both e ects lead to stronger intraand inter-period competition, that is, lower 1 and other parameters.
We can study the e ect of a lower c in two steps. At the rst step consider 1 = 2 = p = f and increase f at the second one. Suppose that v 2 is high enough so all the types produce after two periods, that is, p n 2 = 1. The rst step is then equivalent to a proportional reduction in v 1 and v 2 and our previous characterization applies (Propositions 1 and 2). At the second step, inter-period competition from future sales is relaxed ( f increases). The equilibria in the benchmark setting become then even more asymmetric since the leader increases its rst-period production while the follower does not change it (Proposition 6). The full-commitment setting is not a ected since the two rms never produce sequentially.
Comparison of the equilibria in the benchmark and fullcommitment settings
When competition is absent, there are only asymmetric equilibria in the benchmark setting (Proposition 1) and only symmetric ones in the full-commitment setting (Proposition 2). Then, trivially, the set of symmetric equilibria in the benchmark setting is contained in the set of symmetric equilibria in the full-commitment setting. Under competition, symmetric equilibria may appear in the benchmark setting (Lemma 4) or disappear in the full-commitment setting (Section 3.2.1). However, as we show below in Proposition 7, the sets of symmetric equilibria are still nested.
In order to simplify the exposition, we rst prove Lemma 5. In its statement, the optimal s A is meant.
Lemma 5 (i) If s A = s B in the benchmark setting, then s A = s B in the fullcommitment setting and the pro ts are the same in the two settings.
(ii) If s A 6 = s B (and s A < 1) in either of the two settings, then pro ts in the benchmark setting are strictly higher than in the full-commitment setting.
The next Proposition presents the main result of this section.
Proposition 7
The set of symmetric equilibria in the benchmark setting is contained in the set of symmetric equilibria in the full-commitment setting. Moreover, the inclusion is strict unless the set of symmetric equilibria in the full-commitment setting is empty.
Once Lemma 5 is proven, the proof of Proposition 7 is simple and therefore omitted. Indeed, from Lemma 5(i) it immediately follows that any symmetric equilibrium in the benchmark setting is also a symmetric equilibrium in the full-commitment setting. The fact that the inclusion is strict follows from Lemma 5(ii). The intuition is the following. In the full-commitment setting, principals commit not to change the price in period 2 unless they learn from the other rm that the rst-period o er was too low. As soon as s A 6 = s B , this commitment is costly since types above s A (in case a) or between s A and s B (in case b) are shut down. In the benchmark setting, contracting in period 2 is always ex post optimal. Hence, when the agents are strategic, the principals have an additional motive to set s A = s B .
Another way to state Proposition 7 is that the range of parameters for which there exists a symmetric (asymmetric) equilibrium expands (shrinks) when the setting is changed from the benchmark to the full commitment.
No commitment
In this Section, we analyze the no-commitment setting in which the principals cannot commit to two-period contracts. To simplify the exposition, we assume away competition as we did in Section 2. We rst derive the best response function s A s B and then nd the equilibria. After that we prove that the set of symmetric equilibria is larger in the no-commitment setting than in the full-commitment one. In other words, symmetric behavior of the two rms is more likely the more severe are the contractual problems.
At the beginning of period 1 principal A o ers a rst-period price p 1 .
28 If the agent rejects the o er, she o ers p y 2 or p n 2 depending on whether the other rm produced in period 1 or not. These second-period prices are ex post optimal and higher than p 1 .
As in the full-commitment setting, the agents are strategic, that is, they accept the rst-period o er only when it brings a higher rent than the expected rent in period 2. The cut-o type of the agent which is indi erent as to whether he produces in period 1 or in period 2 is s A given, as in the full commitment setting, by (5) and (7), respectively, depending on whether s A is higher or lower than s B . Now, however, second-period prices p y 2 and p n 2 are not announced in period 1 but expected to arise as ex post optimal in period 2.
The game is solved backwards. In period 2, principal A chooses the optimal p n 2 and p y 2 knowing that she faces an agent with costs higher than s A . In period 1, when deciding about p 1 and, thus, about s A , she takes into account that p 1 will a ect second-period prices. Principal A also takes the behavior of rm B; summarized by the cut-o type s B , as given.
As in the benchmark and full-commitment settings, there are two cases to consider. Let us start with case a, s
If p 1 is rejected by agent A, the fact that rm B has not produced either gives principal A no information as s A s B . Thus, in period 2 she maximizes
Then, the problem of principal A in period 1 is (5) and (9). 
The next Lemma characterizes the optimal s A . For a numerical example see Figure 4 .
Lemma 6 In the no-commitment setting, there exist
such that s A = 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 2 4 min
Proof. See Appendix. is unique to the no-commitment setting.
The second case is illustrated in Figure 4 . When s A becomes lower than s B , an increase in s B causes principal A to o er a higher p y 2 ; however, s A stays constant.
That is, principal A su ers more and more from the inability to commit not to increase the second-period price.
Finding equilibria is again straightforward as there are only symmetric equilibria.
Proposition 8 In the no-commitment setting, there is a continuum of symmetric equilibria in which both principals set the same rst-period price p 1 that results in the
oi . There are no other equilibria.
As in the full-commitment setting, there are multiple symmetric equilibria and no asymmetric ones. The two rms always produce together, either in period 1 or in period 2. They generate the same partition of the type space, i.e., the same information, and the principals use it to commit not to improve their o er, p
The most e cient equilibrium is the "highest" symmetric equilibrium, that is, the one in which s
The comparison with the autarky is ambiguous for two reasons. First, unlike the full-commitment setting, the autarky is relatively e cient since principals cannot shut down high cost types in period 2.
Second, even in the highest equilibrium, rst-period production may be greater or smaller than in the autarky.
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We now show that the set of symmetric equilibria in the no-commitment setting is larger than the one in the full-commitment setting. For this, we use Lemma 7 which is similar to Lemma 5 and has a similar proof (omitted).
Lemma 7 (i) If s A = s B in the full-commitment setting, then s A = s B in the nocommitment setting as well and the pro ts are the same in the two settings.
(ii) If s A 6 = s B (and s A < 1) in either of the two settings, then pro ts in the full-commitment setting are strictly higher than in the no-commitment setting.
The proof is based on the fact that 29 As in the full-commitment setting, a more e cient equilibrium is always associated with higher prices o ered to the agents which means higher rents for them. The pro t-maximizing equilibrium is, however, an intermediate one as we can see in Proposition 9 The set of symmetric equilibria in the full-commitment setting is contained in the set of symmetric equilibria in the no-commitment setting. Moreover, the inclusion is strict unless the set of symmetric equilibria in the no-commitment setting is empty.
From Lemma 7(i) it immediately follows that any symmetric equilibrium in the full-commitment setting is also a symmetric equilibrium in the no-commitment setting. The fact that the inclusion is strict follows from Lemma 7(ii). Intuitively, in the no-commitment setting, when p 1 is smaller than s B , the principals cannot commit not to o er p y 2 > p 1 . However, if p 1 is equal to s B , it e ectively commits the principals not to increase p y 2 as then p 1 = p y 2 = s B . Thus, as compared to the full-commitment setting, there is an additional incentive for the principals to set
Alternative information structures
In this Section, we consider two alternative information structures. First, we study the setup where the costs of the agents are independent with some probability, while still the same with a complementary probability. Second, we assume that, after production by one rm in period 1, the other can learn the costs exactly through reverse engineering. For ease of analysis and exposition, we assume, as in Section 2, that there is no competition.
Imperfect correlation of costs
Here, we relax the assumption that the costs of the two agents are exactly the same. Suppose that there are two available technologies and in period 1 neither the principals nor the agents know if they use the same technology as the other rm.
They only know that it is the same with probability . After period 1 they learn not only about the production of the other rm but also which technology it uses. Then, with probability the costs of the two agents are the same, while with probability 1 they are independent. In the latter case, the production of the other rm in period 1 does not reveal any information. A higher is interpreted as more, or better, information being revealed by each rm in expectation. 
It is intuitive, and can be easily shown, that p 1 = s A decreases with since more information makes waiting more pro table. 30 This implies that the set of symmetric equilibria shrinks from the right.
In the full-commitment setting, case b, the cut-o type s A , instead of (7), becomes
When = 1, principal A commits not to increase the price in period 2 (Lemma 2). For < 1, she has even fewer reasons to contract in period 2 and Lemma 2 extends to this case as well. That is, p 1 = p y;c 2 = p i 2 = s A and we obtain the same solution as the one characterized in Lemma 3. Then, when p 1 = s B , pro ts increase with since a higher increases the chances that the costs of the agent are known to be higher than s B ; in which case some production takes place in period 2. In case a the pro ts are una ected by and, therefore, F C increases with a lower . When = 0 , no information is ever revealed by the other rm and p 1 = v 1 2 for any s B , i.e.,
. This is the autarky solution.
In the no-commitment setting, the cut-o type s A is also given by (13). Since there is no commitment to two-period contracts, at least p i 2 will be higher than p 1 and, thus, s A will be lower than p 1 . There is now a strategic e ect of more information:
This is the precise sense in which the agent becomes softer in bargaining in period 1 when more information is anticipated in the future. This e ect calls for more production in period 1. The strategic e ect is opposite to the direct e ect that we observed in the benchmark setting where more information leads to more production after this information becomes available. It turns out that, in our model, the strategic e ect is always the (weakly) dominating one. This result is the next Lemma.
Lemma 8 In the no-commitment setting, more information increases production in period 1,
This implies that the set of symmetric equilibria expands to the right.
We summarize the main e ects of more information in the next Proposition.
Proposition 10 More information (higher ) (i) decreases the cut-o type s in case b and shrinks the set of symmetric equilibria from the right in the benchmark setting;
(ii) expands the set of symmetric equilibria to the left in the full-commitment setting;
(iii) increases the cut-o type s in case b and expands the set of symmetric equilibria to the right in the no-commitment setting.
The e ects of higher are opposite whether the agent is strategic or not. A higher makes information obtained from the other rm more valuable. In the benchmark setting, this increases incentives of the principals to delay the production and to use information from the other rm. When the agent is strategic, this information can also be used for more e cient contracting in period 1, that is, even before it becomes available (strategic e ect). In the no-commitment setting, this e ects dominates. In the full-commitment setting, the take-it-or-leave-it o er made in period 1 does not depend on . However, whenever s A s B , a higher increases the chances that the principal A will learn that the rst{period o er was too low and will make a better o er in period 2. Then, while s A is not a ected by in both cases a and b, pro ts in case b increase with and, therefore, the set of symmetric equilibria expands to the left ( F C falls).
Perfect learning
So far we have considered "contractual" learning, that is, the inference about the agents' costs made after in period 1 was based solely on the equilibrium contracts.
Often, however, competitors may learn the production costs of a product doing reverse engineering. Then, each principal learns the exact cost of her agent if the other rm has produced in period 1. This is why we call it perfect learning. After no production in period 1, as before, the principal learns only that the agent's cost is above a certain cut-o . As in Section 2, consider the setup without competition.
Case a does not change under perfect learning since, here, rm A does not use the information revealed by rm B.
Consider case b. If agent A does not accept producing at price p 1 , principal A will learn his type and, therefore, will o er p y 2 = in period 2. The agent will not get any rent and, thus, accepts any rst-period price above his cost. That is, the cut-o type s A equals p 1 in all three settings. Even when strategic, the agent behaves "myopically" and the commitment ability of the principal no longer matters.
The problem of principal A is now
Solving it, we obtain
Since in case a perfect learning does not matter, our previous analysis applies for
, in particular, the characterization of the cut-o type s A in Lemmas 1, 3
and 6. For
, the three settings become identical and the same s
is optimal in case b. This implies that
becomes the upper end of the interval where s A = s B . Since
, the sets of symmetric equilibria shrink in the full-commitment and no-commitment settings. In the benchmark setting, symmetric equilibria exist only if inter-period competition is present. For example, under inter-period competition from past sales, (14a) becomes
, which is the same interval as before (Lemma 4, case 0). Therefore, perfect learning does not a ect the set of symmetric equilibria.
31;32
The next Proposition summarizes the main e ects of perfect learning.
Proposition 11 Introduction of perfect learning shrinks the sets of symmetric equilibria from the right in the full-commitment and no-commitment settings.
Under perfect learning, the sets of symmetric equilibria still increase with the severity of the agency problem as before (see Proposition 7). However, this result is now driven by case a where information is not used. In case b, the agency problem is the same across the three settings, and the sets of symmetric equilibria have the same upper endpoint.
31 This is because at s B = v1 v2 2 , when it becomes optimal to have s A < s B , the e ect of perfect learning in terms of higher pro ts is still of the second order.
32 In cases 1 and 2 of the benchmark setting, perfect learning decreases , respectively, since pro ts are higher under perfect learning in case b while remaining unchanged in case a.
Conclusion
This paper investigated informational externalities across intra-rm bargaining games in a market setting. We found that the agency relationship creates a coordination motive in principals' actions making simultaneous production more likely. Each principal uses the information generated by the competitor to discipline her agent. This is done the best when the agents are put in the same conditions, that is, when they face the same incentives to produce. When the agency problem becomes more severe, there are more bene ts in limiting the strategic behavior of the agents and the two rms tend to behave symmetrically even more. The e ects of competition are very di erent depending whether it is intra-or inter-period. Inter-period competition penalizes rms when they produce in di erent periods and, therefore, it is conducive for the simultaneous production. Intra-period competition has an opposite e ect since it pushes rms to di erentiate and to produce in di erent periods. This paper makes a step towards understanding the interactions between internal structure of rms and competition in an industry equilibrium. Competition plays a dual role since it a ects both the costs and the bene ts of solving the agency problem in any given way. The way the agency problem is solved then maps back into competition. We still have a very limited understanding of these interactions and general equilibrium e ects, and more research is needed.
In case b, transforming (4) in a similar way, we obtain that p n 2 = min n v 2 +s B 2
; 1 o and
; if s
We are now left to determine where the change from case a to case b occurs. We will need the following Lemma.
Lemma 9 (i) If p 1 = s B in both cases, the pro ts are the same.
(ii) If p 1 = s B in one of the two cases and p 1 6 = s B in the other, then pro ts are higher in the latter.
Proof. (i) True by comparing (1) and (3) (for the latter case,
(ii) True since p 1 = s B is feasible in both cases.
We will say that p 1 (and the corresponding case) is constrained when p 1 = s B in this case. If only one case is constrained, the other is optimal. The change from case a to case b occurs when either both are unconstrained, or both are constrained (so p 1 = s B ) and one case becomes unconstrained.
There are the following parameter ranges to consider. , case b is optimal.
Proposition 1 In the benchmark setting, there are only two equilibria and they are asymmetric:
1, in one rm the cut-o is
and in the other it is
< 1, in one rm the cut-o is
Proof. Plug optimal second-period prices from (2) and (4) into (1) Since symmetric pure-strategy equilibria do not exist (Corollary 1), we look for asymmetric ones. Then, one rm (say, A) will be in case b while the other rm, rm B, will be in case a.
Case 1:
(see Lemma 1). Then, the reaction of rm B is
, that is,
For , the di erence in pro ts is positive:
Case 2:
33 Note that while BM is continuous in both arguments, it may not be quasiconcave in s A (it may be M-shaped). Then, the standard theorem for the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (Theorem 1.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) . Once these prices are plugged into (1) and (3), the di erence in pro ts is positive:
Proof of Lemma 3. Using Lemma 2, (6) becomes , therefore,
and is found from the equality of pro ts in the two cases with the corresponding prices inserted.
Lemma 10 In the benchmark setting, under inter-period competition from past sales, Proof. Proceeds in the same way as the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 5.
The proof is based on the fact that (ii) Suppose s A > s B in the benchmark setting, then p n 2 > s A . In the fullcommitment setting, in order to have the same s A , principal A sets p 1 = p n 2 = s A . The prices are di erent in the two settings and, therefore, the full-commitment pro ts are lower than the benchmark ones. If s A < s B , it is p y 2 which is di erent in the two settings. If s A 6 = s B in the full-commitment setting, again, either p n 2 or p y 2 will be equal to p 1 while this is not the case in the benchmark setting.
Proof of Lemma 6. As before, there are two possible cases depending on whether s A is higher or lower than s B . In each of these cases there are two subcases. We solve each subcase, write the combined solution for each case, and then characterize the (full) solution.
Start with case a, i.e., solving (10). There are two subcases. The maximization problem (11) The maximization problem (11) The cut-o N C 2 is found from the equality of (18) and (19) (17) 
